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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The court distinguishes its decision by which it finds a valuable con-
sideration in the instant case for the defendant's promise, in this
fashion: "True it is that some dicta will be found in the opinion
that the so-called 'Bank Night' promises were void because of lack
of consideration. However, the rule promulgated in a criminal prose-
cution is unlike that in a civil suit. * * * the above cases construed
a criminal statute. Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. The
rights of a prize winner were in no wise discussed or involved, and
any reference to the invalidity of the contract by reason of inade-
quate consideration must be assumed to be obiter dictum." n
L..
CONTRACT - DECEIT - REPREsENTATIONS-OPINIONS.-This is
an action for deceit brought against the defendant corporation for the
alleged fraudulent statements made by its sales agent, one Freeman.
The alleged fraud arose in the following manner: The plaintiff, a
noted violinist, purchased the violin in question from Freeman with a
certificate stating that the violin was the work of a great "Master,
Antonius Stradivarius in Cremona 1717 as shown by the label it
bears", and that the "top" (also described as "belly" or "table") was
of "Spruce of Stradivarius' choicest selection and unique among his
violins as we have seen by reason of its unusual strength". It is fur-
ther to be noted that in its numerous previous sales the instrument
had always been regarded as a genuine Stradivarius. The plaintiff,
after using the violin satisfactorily for more than ten years, and after
stating, "It is one of the finest Stradivarius violins in existence and
totally unsurpassed" discovered that the "left half of the top" was not
the original work of Stradivarius, but that it was the substituted work
of, probably, a French artisan, who had made repairs upon the instru-
ment in 1840 and 1850. Therefore the plaintiff brought this action
for the difference between what he had paid for the violin and its
actual value. Held, judgment for plaintiff in lower court reversed
and complaint dismissed. No action lies for deceit where scienter,
a necessary element of the tort, is lacking or where the statements
made by the agent were mere opinions or beliefs rather than repre-
sentations. Banner v. Lyon and Healy, 249 App. Div. 569, 293 N. Y.
Supp. 236 (1st Dept. 1937).
Deceit actions will lie when one party to an agreement know-
theatre to obtain his prize without any expense to him." People v. Mail &
Express Co., 179 N. Y. Supp. 640 (1919), aff'd, 231 N. Y. 586, 132 N. E. 898
(1921).
' Wecht, J., in Simmons v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 162 Misc. 491,
293 N. Y. Supp. 745 (1937).
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RECENT DECISIONS
ingly I makes a false representation concerning a material fact 2 with
which he intends to 3 and actually does induce the innocent party to
act to his own detriment.4 In the action at bar, scienter (knowingly
making a false statement) was found to be lacking by the court.
Therefore, since one of the essential elements of a deceit action was
lacking, the action would not lie.5
The instant case, however, presents another question the solu-
tion of which had some bearing on the dismissal of the complaint,
namely, whether the alleged statements were representations or opin-
ions? A representation is any statement made with regard "to some
fact, circumstance or state of facts pertinent to the contract which is
influential in bringing about the agreement." 6 Thus, when a false
representation of a material fact is made, the injured party may seek
relief by either commencing a deceit action in a court of law 7 or
claiming equitable relief in the form of rescission,8 or any other rem-
edy which justice may require.' However, before the individual can
receive any assistance, it must be decided whether the statement is a
representation of fact or an opinion, for if the statement is the latter
no relief may be had.10 "It is not always easy to determine whether
a given statement is one of opinion or of fact." 11 The fact that the
language of the speaker is in opinion form is certainly not control-
ling.12  The court considers the subject matter and the superior
knowledge of the one making the representation in determining
whether the statement is in reality one of fact.'3 Whether or not the
subject matter is such as would not usually be known to the party,
and whether reliance is placed on the superior knowledge of the one
1 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931) ; Thayer
v. Schelley, 137 App. Div. 166, 121 N. Y. Supp. 1064 (1st Dept. 1910) ; Rose
v. Goodale, 169 N. Y. Supp. 446 (1918).
Moore v. Abbey, 213 App. Div. 787, 210 N. Y. Supp. 766 (4th Dept. 1925).
'Habebb v. Dass, 111 Misc. 437, 181 N. Y. Supp. 392 (1920), aff'd, 196
App. Div. 974, 188 N. Y. Supp. 925 (2d Dept. 1921).
'EDGAR AND EDGAR, TORTS (3d ed. 1936) 178-187; Seneca Wire & Mfg.
Co. v. Leach, 247 N. Y. 1, 159 N. E. 700 (1928); Long v. Warren, 68 N. Y.
426 (1887); Ochs v. Woods, 221 N. Y. 335, 117 N. E. 305 (1917); Humphrey
v. Merrian, 32 Minn. 197, 20 N. W. 138 (1884).
5Ibid.
'BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) 1020. Fitzgerald v. Supreme
Council, 39 App. Div. 259, 56 N. Y. Supp. 1005 (4th Dept. 1899) ; Foster v.
McAlester, 3 Ind. Terr. 307, 58 S. W. 679 (1900).
'EDGAR AND EDGAR, TORTS (3d ed. 1936) 178.
'WHITNEY, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1934) 126.
0 WHITNEY, 10C. cit. supra note 8; EDGAR AND EDGAR, 10C. cit. supra note 7;
Merry Realty Co. v. Shamokin, 230 N. Y. 316, 30 N. E. 306 (1921).
"WHITNEY, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1934) 120; Oberlander v. Spiess, 45 N. Y.
175 (1871); Yasewen v. Pollack, 155 Misc. 475, 280 N. Y. Supp. 512
(1934); Brady v. Cole, 164 Ill. 116, 45 N. E. 438 (1896).
16 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & PROCEDURE (Pop. ed. 1909); Marshall v.
Seeley, 49 App. Div. 433, 63 N. Y. Supp. 355 (1st Dept. 1900).
'Watson v. People, 87 N. Y. 561 (1881).
" See note 11, supra.
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making the statement are usually questions of fact for the jury.14
Since Derry v. Peek,15 courts have encountered difficulty in formu-
lating any one principle that would be applicable to all cases. They
have decided each case on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. 16
The decision in the case at bar dismissing the complaint seems
justified because the statements made to the plaintiff were mere opin-
ions since: (1) plaintiff was himself an expert in violins and could
not have relied on the superior knowledge of the seller and (2) he
was in a position to draw his own conclusions from the documents
presented and the complexity of the instrument. On the other hand,
if the buyer had no knowledge concerning violins and relied solely
on the vendor's statements, a different situation would have been
presented and it would seem that the statements would be deemed
representations.
17
B.B.
CRIMINAL CONVERSATION AND ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-
Loss OF ACTION DUE TO "HEART BALM" LAw.-Plaintiff sued to
recover damages for criminal conversation and alienation of affec-
tions of his wife, the acts alleged occurring subsequent to the enact-
ment of Article 2-A of the New York Civil Practice Act.' The
Appellate Division of the Second Department declared the statute to
be unconstitutional on the ground that the legislature cannot validly
abrogate a common law action without replacing it with an adequate
substitute. On appeal, held, reversed. Quoting substantially from
the report of Fearon v. Treanor,2 the court ruled that the legislature
146 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & PROCEDURE (Pop. ed. 1909); Marshall v.
Seeley, 49 App. Div. 433, 63 N. Y. Supp. 335 (1st Dept. 1900).
' L. R. 14 App. Cas. 337, H. L. (1889) ; KERR, FAUD & MISTAKE (4th ed.
1910) 397, 400.
16 Frank v. Bradley, 42 App. Div. 178, 58 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (1st Dept.
1899); Benedict Co. v. McKeage, 201 App. Div. 761, 195 N. Y. Supp. 288 (3d
Dept. 1922); Brady v. Edwards, 35 Misc. 435, 71 N. Y. Supp. 972 (1901);
Jackson v. Collins, 39 Mich. 557 "(1878) ; Hirschberg Optical Co. v. Michaelsen,
1 Neb. 137, 95 N. W. 461 (1901) ; People's Bank v. Romano, 62 P. (2d) 445
(1936).1 In Powell v. Fletcher, 45 St. R. 294, 18 N. Y. Supp. 451 (1892), it was
held that where a dealer in violins is an expert and the buyer is not, a false
and fraudulent opInion will make the vendor liable.
'N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT art. 2-A, § 61b: "The rights of action heretofore
existing to recover sums of money as damages for the alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, seduction, or breach of promise to marry are hereby
abolished."
2Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268, 5 N. E. (2d) 815 (1936) (declaring
constitutional that, part of Section 61b abolishing remedies for seduction and
breach of promise to marry).
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